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Abstract 
This chapter focuses on the role of corporate financial strategies to improve firms’ market 
valuations, and thus lower their cost of capital. The identification of successful strategies is 
accomplished within an overall strategic framework and related to how the firm perceives the 
degree  of  international  financial  integration.  Five  strategies  for  how  to  break  out  of  a 
segmented, thin domestic capital market are highlighted together with historical success cases. 
The chapter illustrates the linkages between business strategy, firm motivation, and various 
financial strategies. 
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What Can International Finance Add to International Strategy? 
 
Introduction 
The 1980s and 1990s offered a remarkable increase in international financial integration of 
many OECD countries but left many small emerging and developing countries outside this 
“global” financial market. In the integration process as described in Oxelheim (1996), the 
Nordic economies were able to foster a remarkable number of high-growth capital intensive 
companies,  such as Nokia from  Finland, Ericsson  from  Sweden,  and  Novo-Nordisk  from 
Denmark. We argue that without the skillful global financial strategies that enabled these 
companies to access global savings, the limited domestic availability and high cost of capital 
would  have  hampered  their  growth.  We  suggest  that  these  company  historical  accounts 
provide valuable insight for scholars as well as for executives today, in particular for smaller 
and medium-sized growth-oriented firms from emerging economies.   
  In order to succeed in a global financial market, firms’ executives must be capable of 
delivering the strategy story to the stock analysts and, ultimately, share value to the money 
managers (Useem, 1998). We find Useem’s argument being equally true today. The on-going 
globalization  of  equity  markets  provides  the  firm  the  opportunity  to  actively  reduce 
information and agency costs, and hence to contribute to higher firm values by the means of 
lower cost of capital (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004; Hearn, 
Piesse and Strange, 2010; Mittoo and Zhang, 2008) and better corporate governance (Coffee, 
2002; Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003). This is particularly true for emerging markets or thin 
capital markets (O’Connor, 2011). The rise of global portfolio investment has laid the ground 
for more emphasis on shareholder relations. The international portfolio managers judge the 
potential company to  invest  in  against the best-performing firms  in  each industry  and no 3 
longer against its domestic peers only. For small and medium sized companies in particular, 
but also for large companies outside the Anglo-American world, and major countries like 
Japan  and  Germany,  the  gain  of  access  to  highly  liquid  and  competitively  priced  capital 
markets can effectively boost growth.  
In  the  rest  of  this  chapter  we  will  emphasize  successful  financial  strategies  for 
companies from small and/or emerging economies for gaining global investor recognition. 
The brief story of Nokia’s rise to become the global leader in cell phone production may serve 
as an introduction. 
When the fast growing telecommunication company Nokia of Finland needed US$ 
485 million in 1994, access to competitively priced funds was necessary in order to keep pace 
with competitors. In early 1994 the common stocks of Nokia´s major competitors were priced 
at 22 (Motorola) and 25 (Ericsson) times earnings, however, Nokia was valued at only 14 
times earnings. To become more attractive to global investors, the firm listed on the NYSE 
(New York Stock Exchange) and made a Euro-equity offering. Within three months of NYSE 
trading Nokia’s stock had gained 45% versus a 2% gain for the NYSE composite index. 
Nokia had achieved global recognition among investors, and was now classified and priced as 
one of the peers in the telecommunication industry. Today the level of market segmentation in 
relation to a country like Finland – is much smaller – and the costs of NYSE listing has 
increased significantly – so the net benefits of such listing is now less obvious. Hence, it boils 
down to a cost-benefit analysis of investing in global recognition. Some of the investments 
coincide with investing in the build-up of a corporate brand name. Or to put it differently, the 
financial strategy to internationalize overlaps with the international marketing strategy.  
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we address increased financial 
integration and a better access to global savings implying that a Swedish firm may borrow 
savings from households in Australia to invest in the US. Thereafter we discuss why having a 4 
financial strategy matters. Then follows a review of barriers to an international cost of capital 
that have to be circumvented or passed by the firm. We use longitudinal company cases to 
provide  lesson  to  firms  from  thin  or  emerging  capital  markets  of  the  early  2010s.  Then 
follows a section in which we link the business strategy, financial strategy and corporate 
performance. The chapter ends with concluding remarks. 
  
On the segmentation of capital markets  
 
The  benefits  of  having  a  corporate  financial  strategy  are  closely  linked  to  the  degree  of 
capital market integration. Firms that are based in a country with a segmented and thin capital 
market have a lot to gain from breaking out of its domestic capital, thus being able to reap the 
benefit  of  a  global  cost  of  capital.  Firms,  facing  a  perfectly  integrated  financial  market, 
should consequently not spend too much effort on cross-border financial issues. It can then be 
discussed how to measure the degree of international financial integration and how to act in 
accordance  with  this  assessment.  The  overall  financial  integration  encompasses  all  the 
financial market segments (money, bond and equity), but the measurement process boils in 
all cases down to a “law of one price” process (Oxelheim, 1990; Yeyati, Schmukler and Van 
Horen 2009). Below we discuss the equity market integration. 
Over  the  last  decades  a  significant  volume  of  research  has  focused  on  ways  of 
measuring equity market integration from an econometric point of view. Various schools of 
thought have developed, but for most of them the point of departure has been much the same: 
the law of one price, which states that if two or more markets are integrated, then identical 
securities should be priced identically in all of them. The controversial issue dividing the 
different schools concerns what “being priced identically” actually means.  
One strand in the literature, which highlights identical movements, is based on the 
analysis of co-movements of equity-market returns. For the analysis of correlation of returns 5 
– prominent research is done by; Ahn and Kudo, 2011; Lau and Diltz, 1994; Lin, Engle and 
Ito 1994; for correlation of hourly returns, see Susmel and Engle, 1994; for stability over 
longer  periods,  see  Erb,  Harvey  and  Viskanta,  1994;  Ibrahimi,  Oxelheim  and  Wihlborg, 
1995; Longin and Solnik, 1995; and for stability around the Black Monday or Crash of 1987, 
see for example King, Santana and Whadmani, 1994. For the recent turmoil around the post-
2008 finacial crisis, see Muna and Brooks (2012). Furthermore, Solnik (1996) provides an 
overview  of  correlations  between  industrialized  markets  and  concludes  that  whereas 
measuring co-movements in equity-market returns in isolation leads to conclusions in terms 
of weak integration, measures of strong integration also involve the analysis of return gaps 
between equity-markets. 
  As the other major strand of literature many schools of thought in the area of finance 
assume strong financial market integration – i.e. start from the law of one price, but then after 
risks  have  been  taken  into  account.  In  studies  adopting  this  more  stringent  definition  of 
integration the thrust of the analysis can vary. For example,  from the role of currency risk 
(see e.g. Jorion, 1985), long-term differences in risk- adjusted returns (see e.g.  Ibbotson, 
Siegel and Love, 1985), optimal international asset allocation (see e.g. Glen and Jorion 1993; 
Odier and Solnik, 1993), international asset pricing with extended CAPM (see e.g. Graham
 
and  Nikkinen,  2011;  Hietala,  1989),  home  country  preference  bias  (see  e.g.  French  and 
Poterba,  1991;  Cooper  and  Kaplanis,  1994;  Tesar  and  Werner,  1995),  the  international 
pricing  of  risks  (see  e.g.  Harvey,  1991;  Dumas,  1994),  international  asset  pricing  with 
extended APT (see. e.g. Bansal, Hsieh and Viswanathan, 1993), and finally international 
asset pricing with consumption-based models (see e.g. Wheatley, 1988).  
  Taken together all these studies point in the same direction: towards increasing equity 
market  integration. But  when it comes to  the degree of integration, the results  are often 
inconclusive, even in the case of comparable markets and periods. This claim is supported by 6 
Naranjo and Protopapadakis (1997), who provide an overview of integration test results. The 
authors  argue  that  the  conflicting  results  may  be  partly  due  to  the  lack  of  an  economic 
benchmark of integration with which the statistical tests can be compared. Oxelheim (2001) 
argues that the inconclusive results as regards to the degree of completeness of equity market 
integration reflects the composition of the stock market indices used and how they mirror a 
two-tier integration, i.e., the polarization of firms with global recognition and those without.  
  Fulfillment of the various prerequisites marks out different stages on the way towards 
perfect financial market integration (Oxelheim, 2001). The first prerequisite is the absence of 
capital controls that effectively prevent cross-border equity transactions – issues and trade. 
The second prerequisite concerns the efficiency of internal regulations and the absence of tax 
wedges and prohibitive transaction costs. The third prerequisite concerns the exchange of 
information and the absence of cross-border information asymmetries, including differences 
between corporate governance systems and information costs. 
The process of integration as comprised by the fulfillment of these three prerequisites 
reflects activities of three major stakeholder groups: politicians with their dual function of 
trying to retain control over capital flows on the one hand and achieving a sound and safe 
financial infrastructure on the other; investors searching for profit opportunities; and managers 
trying to internationalize the cost of capital while maintaining control.  
Historically,  there  has  been  considerable  theoretical  and  empirical  research  on  the 
segmentation  of  international  capital  markets.    However,  few  studies  have  addressed  the 
specific managerial challenges that internationalization of capital implies. The research issue 
of this chapter is to focus on the way individual companies can undertake actions to improve 
their market valuations, and thus their cost of capital. The key ingredients are the linkages 
between  business  strategy,  firm  motivation,  and  various  financial  strategies  to  reduce  the 
corporate cost of capital.  7 
 
Why Financial Strategy Matters 
There is a widespread misperception that financial strategy does not add value to the firm. 
This line of reasoning goes back to the research of two Nobel Prize economists, Modigliani 
and Miller. The implication of this view is basically that finance is irrelevant to corporate 
success. However, this argument ignores many facts like that all capital markets are not alike 
and information  is  not  evenly distributed across  nations.  Even for highly liquid  and  well 
functioning capital markets, such as the one in the United States, a study of 750 companies 
reveals that better disclosure boosts stock price (Lang & Lundholm, 1996).  If there is no 
value creation in pursuing specific financial strategies, then companies ought considering to 
lay off their highly paid investor relations executives to enhance their stock price. On the 
contrary,  we  suggest  that  most  markets  are  not  fully  financially  integrated  providing 
companies from these countries a reason to invest in more in financial strategies and investor 
relations  than  their  peers  in  other  markets  in  order  to  escape  a  mispriced  and/or  illiquid 
domestic stock market. The need for an active investor relations function is also shown by the 
fact that global investors strongly favor more visible (and larger) firms when investing in 
small equity markets (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001).  
 
Barriers to an international cost of capital 
We argue that corporate competitiveness is enhanced when a firm’s dependence on an illiquid 
or partially segmented capital market is reduced. Financial market segmentation implies that a 
firm  from  one  country  faces  higher  financial  costs  than  an  exact  similar  company  from 
another country. Research points to five major avenues to get an international cost of capital 
and increased competitiveness. The first route to internationalize the cost of capital is to list 8 
the company’s shares on one or more foreign stock exchanges and the second route is to float 
equity issues to investors in one or more foreign countries. These two routes encompass in 
fact many different levels of ambition as is highlighted in Figure 1. The safest alternative for 
the inexperienced firm is to follow all the steps of the staircase starting with listing bonds at a 
less prestigious market. The boldest firm, however, go straight to the last step at once, even 
without a prior listing in their financial home market. This last-mentioned alternative has been 
adopted by many high-tech Israeli firms finding the home market too small to digest the risks 
of the firm. The listing enhances liquidity of shares, and for the availability of new capital a 
float of an equity issue is necessary. A third route to internationalizing the cost of capital is 
via a strategic alliance. Foreign industrial investors can overcome a segmented capital market 
by infusing equity into a target partner. A forth route to internationalize the cost of capital is 
to import a harsher governance regime on the board of the firm by recruiting a board member 
from the country of that regime (Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003). Finally, the fifth avenue – for 
which the lasting impact can be debated - is to get a lower cost of capital by attracting support 
from central and local government agencies (Oxelheim and Ghauri, 2009).  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
  In the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s one major venue for companies to escape a 
“thin”, inefficient and heavily regulated domestic market was to place an equity issue on a 
foreign “prestigious” capital market. As previously stressed the internationalization of the cost 
of capital was a process with three stakeholders: investors, regulators, and managers. Investors 
are  characterized  by  an  endless  search  for  new  profit  opportunities  and  portfolio  risk 
reduction.  On  the  other  hand  regulators  pursue  policies  that  are  aimed  at  insulating  the 
domestic  market  from  the  global  one,  and  managers  strive  to  eliminate  disadvantages  by 9 
trying to circumvent barriers and restrictions imposed by regulators. A successful stock issue 
should render the company benefits from a higher price/earnings ratio, or price to book ratio, 
abroad as compared to the one at home. 
  Corporate managers of firms resident in segmented equity markets will be rewarded 
for financial strategies that overcome the causes of capital market segmentation. These causes 
are as follows:  
 
*  Asymmetric  information  available  to  investors  resident  in  different  countries.    This 
includes not only financial data on corporations but also the analytic methods used to 
evaluate the validity of a security’s price.     
*  Different tax regulations, especially with regard to the treatment of capital gains and the 
double taxation of dividends.   
*  Regulation of securities markets.   
*  Alternative sets of optimal portfolios from the perspective of investors resident in one 
equity market compared to investors resident in other equity markets.   
*  Different agency costs for firms located in bank-dominated markets compared to firms 
located in the Anglo-American markets.   
*  Different levels of financial risk tolerance, such as debt ratios, in different countries.   
*  Differences in perceived foreign exchange risk, especially with respect to operating and 
transaction exposures.   
*  Takeover  defenses  that  differ  widely  between  the  Anglo-American  markets, 
characterized by one-share-one vote norms, and other markets featuring dual classes of 
stock and other takeover barriers.   
*  The level of transaction costs involved in purchasing, selling, and trading securities.  
*  Political  risk  such  as  unpredictable  government  interference  in  capital  markets  and 
arbitrary changes in rules.   
 
    The  relative  importance  of  each  of  these  barriers  changes  over  time  and  across 
countries  and  produce  the  overall  degree  of  international  financial  integration  of  a  given 
country. Moreover, when it comes to the financial strategy of a given firm it is also a question 10 
of firms’ ability to benefit from market imperfections. However, it is hard to find consistent, 
i.e., across companies, evidence on how successful firms have been in exploiting these market 
imperfections.    At  the  corporate  level  success  is  not  only  a  matter  of  identification  of 
misalignments in macro market prices but also a matter of the perceived ability of financial 
managers to exploit them (Oxelheim, Thorsheim and Wihlborg, 2011). In this chapter we use 
cases to illustrate the variety of corporate strategies employed to internationalize firms’ cost of 
capital, as they evolved over time and across countries.  
 
The Path to Internationalization of Capital 
Let us in this section go deeper into the different financial strategies. Figure 1 shows how 
foreign  equity  markets  are  normally  tapped  using  one  or  a  combination  of  two  financial 
strategies. The preparation and a first strategy consists of the cross-listing of the company’s 
shares.  The  second    strategy  is  then  to  make  a  directed  issue  of  stocks,  straight  bonds, 
convertible bonds, or a hybrid instrument, sold in a specific foreign equity market.  A directed 
private placement is also feasible. The broadening of the second strategy is to make a Euro-
equity issue sold in several equity markets simultaneously.  This usually includes the home 
market in addition to foreign markets. In addition to the two strategies highlighted in Figure 1, 
a third related strategy is to receive an equity injection from a foreign partner as part of a 
strategic alliance.  
Because of transaction and information acquisition barriers in the international capital 
market, a firm typically starts to raise funds in the domestic financial market. The information 
barriers are commonly larger for equity issues than for bond issues. Ideally, firms would like 
to jump from the domestic capital market to a “Euro-equity issue.” This is usually impossible 
because the international investment community does not know the average firm.   11 
The normal path of internationalizing a firm’s capital is to start with an international 
bond issue in a less prestigious market. This provides the firm with added experience and 
enhanced visibility (and scrutiny) in the financial market. If possible, it is desirable to skip this 
first step and go directly to the next steps, international bond issue in a liquid target market or 
a  Eurobond  issue  sold  in  several  markets.  Raising  equity  requires  more  commitment  to 
disclosure and investor relations. A firm could start by listing and selling equity in a less 
prestigious market, i.e. not the United States or the United Kingdom. This is even more costly 
in time and money than a bond issue, but still commonly less costly than a full-scale listing 
and equity issue in the United States or the United Kingdom.   
The ultimate financial strategy – particular for large firms - is to have a Euro-equity 
issue sold simultaneously in both foreign equity markets and the domestic market. Within the 
Nordic area Electrolux (1986) was among the first to tap the Euro-equity market. Euro-equity 
issue is also the path being taken by some of privatized firms, such as Tele-Danmark in 1994. 
 
Cross-listings 
Firms  cross-list  on  foreign  stock  exchanges  for  a  variety  of  reasons  whether  or  not  they 
actually sell equity issues abroad (e.g. Modén and Oxelheim, 1997; Karolyi, 1998; and for an 
overview see Pagano and Röell, 2007). The main documented motives are as follows.  
 
*  Achieve a world pricing of its equity when the home market is segmented.   
*  Improve  the  international  visibility  of  the  firm’s  products  and  securities  to  its 
customers, suppliers, creditors and host governments.  
*  Make it easier for the firm’s foreign stockholders to trade its shares in their home 
markets and currencies, thus increasing the stock’s overall liquidity.   
*  Foreign underwriters insist on local listing in their markets to help market a new equity 
issue.     12 
*  Create  a  liquid  secondary  market  for  shares  used  to  acquire  foreign  firms,  or  to 
distribute to employees of foreign subsidiaries.   
*  Comply with governmental requirements for financing foreign investments.   
 
  The extent to which a firm’s stock price can be increased by merely cross-listing on a 
foreign stock exchange, without a simultaneous equity issue, depends on how severely the 
home  market  is  segmented  and  what  efforts  the  firm  has  made  to  attract  international 
investors.  Sundaram and Logue (1996) found a favorable effect on stock prices for foreign 
firms that cross-listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges during 1982-1992. 
However, Modén and Oxelheim (1997) report that a simultaneous equity issue and cross-
listing on the New York and American Stock Exchanges by Swedish firms generates a higher 
shareholder value than a mere cross-listing because of the stronger commitment by the issuing 
firm it signals.   
Foreign  investors can acquire a firm’s stock through transactions  on foreign stock 
exchanges.  By cross-listing on their home stock market, a firm can help those investors to 
trade shares and receive dividends in their home currency.  The hope is to increase overall 
liquidity for trading the firm’s shares and to encourage the foreign investors to hold the firm’s 
shares rather than selling them back to the firm’s home market.   
 
Directed Stock Issue  
A  directed  stock  issue  is  defined  as  one  targeted  at  investors  in  a  single  country  and 
underwritten in whole or in part by investment institutions from that country. The issue might 
or might not be listed on a stock exchange in the target market.   
Directed stock issues were the investment of choice for Nordic firms in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Segmentation of the home equity markets made it difficult to attract international 
investors  with  a  “shotgun”  approach.  Indeed,  the  early  Nordic  equity  issues  abroad  were 13 
focused and heavily promoted by Goldman, Sachs and Company (Novo Industri A/S), and 
Morgan Stanley (L.M. Ericsson AB, Fortia AB/Pharmacia, and Gambro).  
Directed stock issues have been particularly useful to Nordic firms desiring to improve 
the liquidity of their shares, to achieve international pricing of their shares, and to become 
more visible to customers and suppliers.  Even after the Nordic equity markets became less 
segmented,  directed  stock  issues  have  been  useful  to  fund  acquisitions  or  new  capital 
investments in the targeted foreign market. This was the motivation for Norwegian-based 
Hafslund Nycomed’s directed share issues in London (1989) and the United States (1992), as 
well as its listing on the New York Stock Exchange (1992). 
At the end of the 1990s the pattern of directed issues turned from having been more or 
less 100% cash issues into more or less 100% non-cash issues. All growth firms used their 
own shares to pay for acquisitions (Oxelheim, 2001). However, this pattern did not at all 
reduce the burden on management of having a successful financial strategy. 
 
Euro-equity Issues  
Not only have Nordic equity markets become less segmented but this  trend is happening 
worldwide.  This  occurred  simultaneously  with  a  rapid  increase  in  international  portfolio 
investment over the last twenty five  years.  As a result, a robust Euro-equity market has 
evolved starting in the mid-1980s.   
Firms are able to issue equity, which is underwritten and distributed in more than one 
foreign equity market, sometimes simultaneously with distribution in the home market.  The 
same  financial  institutions  that  form  the  backbone  of  the  Eurobond  market  are  the  main 
players in the newer Euro-equity market.   
The Euro-equity market has been the main vehicle for privatizing large public utilities 
from both industrialized and emerging markets. Nordic privatizations have in the recent past 14 
made use of the Euro-equity market and are expected to do more of the same in the future.  
Notable examples are the privatization of Tele Danmark (1994), Telia of Sweden (2000), and 
Telenor of Norway (2000). It should be noted that this capital market only developed during 
the past decade, so earlier Nordic equity issues did not really have a choice to use it.   
Simultaneous distribution in several equity markets implies a single worldwide price. 
This price is often somewhat different than the previous home market price but results from a 
compromise among the various national underwriters.   
 
Strategic Alliances  
Strategic  alliances  are  usually  created  to  take  advantage  of  synergies  in  joint  marketing, 
product development, or other commercial activities. However, financial synergy may also 
arise if a financially strong firm helps a financially weak partner by injecting favorably priced 
equity or debt into it. 
The equity-based strategic alliances have in most cases helped the receiving firm to 
boost  its  stock  price.  However,  in  most  cases  the  alliance  relationship  has  been  a  "trial 
marriage".  After  some  years  the  strategic  alliance  typically  ends  with  either  a 
merger/acquisition (as with Elektrisk Bureau). The strategic alliance between Huhtamaki and 
Procordia  was  finished  after  three  years.  However,  Elektrisk  Bureau  A/S  and  ASEA  AB 
ended as a merger after five years.  
The key to financial synergy with respect to equity pricing is that portfolio investors 
price  shares  according  to  their  expected  risk-adjusted  rate  of  return.    This  is  necessarily 
somewhat  biased  by  past  performance,  but  in  any  case  cannot  usually  anticipate  the 
synergistic effects of a strategic alliance that does not yet exist. Thus, the value of equity in 
Bang  &  Olufsen  was  higher  from  the  perspective  of  Philips  NV,  which  anticipated  the 
operating and financial synergies, than Bang & Olufsen’s value to the existing market of 15 
portfolio investors. Bang & Olufsen realized many of the anticipated synergies. Its operating 
performance improved dramatically. It also enjoyed a hefty share price increase compared to 
the Danish market as a whole. In 1997 it was able to repurchase its shares that were held by 
Philips NV but continued most other aspects of the strategic alliance.  
 
Internationalization of Corporate Governance  
The globalization of ownership creates an opportunity for foreign shareholders to buy large 
stakes in the firm. However, the investors must have confidence that the capital they provide 
will  be  properly  monitored.  For  small  shareholders  the  cost  of  getting  involved  may  be 
prohibitive. But larger shareholders can afford active monitoring, for instance through foreign 
board membership (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 2007). Board representatives for large foreign 
shareholders are presumably “outsiders” who will not use their influence as board members to 
obtain benefits that do not accrue to other shareholders (see, e.g., Stulz, 1999). As they are 
more likely to perform the arm’s-length monitoring, their entry as owners should increase the 
value of the firm.   
Compliance  with  the  stricter  information  and  monitoring  requirements  of  a  more 
demanding corporate governance system can substantially increase a firm’s costs. However, 
this also discourages managers from extracting private benefits, and it therefore strengthens 
the  firm’s  commitment  to  protecting  the  interests  of  minority  shareholders  (Reese  and 
Weisback, 2001). Foreign listing – or the undertaking of foreign equity issues - is a costly 
affair  for  the  firm,  both  in  terms  of  outright  expenses  and  in  terms  of  top  management 
involvement (Oxelheim et. al. 1998; Blass and Yafeh, 2001).  
Many  firms  might  ex  ante  consider  a  foreign  listing  too  costly.  For  these  firms, 
however, there is a way of achieving a global cost of capital at a lower outright cost. In 
exercising this option a firm signals its willingness to improve the monitoring opportunities 16 
by including foreign outsider members on the board. This alternative of “importing” a more 
demanding corporate governance system by having one or more representatives of that system 
as board members signals a higher commitment to corporate monitoring and transparency. 
Oxelheim  and  Randøy  (2003)  suggest  that  the  presence  of  at  least  one  foreign  outsider 
member representing a more demanding system, i.e. the Anglo-American system, will result 
in more active boards that are more independent of management. The key ingredient of this 
alternative is the bridging of the previously mentioned cross-border information gap, and an 
improvement in corporate governance – in which value can be created through access to new 
investors. New and/or improved access to a foreign investor clientele should entail a higher 
share price, and thus a lower cost of capital (Oxelheim et al. 1998; Bekaert and Harvey, 
2000).  
Most past corporate governance studies have presumed implicitly that a company is 
embedded in the corporate governance model of its home country (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Vishny, 1999), unless the firm is a subsidiary of a foreign 
company.  An  examination  of  the  impact  of  outsider  foreign  board  membership  needs  to 
consider  three  different  board  mandates.  One  alternative  is  that  the  board  member  has  a 
mandate to represent an owner with a major commercial or long-lasting interest in the firm 
such as a foreign direct investment (FDI) or a subsidiary. A second alternative is that the 
board member represents a foreign owner with a big portfolio stake in the firm. Finally, the 
board member may be an independent outsider chosen by the company specifically to signal 
its willingness to comply with another corporate governance system. The choice is assumed 
here to be independent of ownership structure. By having at least one foreign board member 
in this third category and representing the Anglo-American system, the firm is signaling its 
willingness to be monitored by the rules of a more demanding corporate governance system.  17 
The  strongest  consistent  signal  of  commitment  is  assumed  to  emerge  from  a 
combination of a cross-listing on the Anglo-American markets and the inclusion of at least 
one independently chosen outsider foreign board member representing the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system. Both these features indicate an improvement in monitoring and 
an increase in  transparency, which  is  valued  by  investors (Oxelheim  and Randöy, 2003). 
Hence, a forth strategy and a low-cost alternative to foreign listing and equity issues is to add 
one or more independent directors from a prestigious capital market to the corporate board of 
directors (Randøy and Oxelheim, 2003). This might improve corporate governance of the 
firm,  and help  it to  build  confidence with  foreign investors.  Hence,  given the substantial 
increases in costs related to foreign listings – particularly in the U.S. – a viable alternative to a 
foreign listing might be internationalization of the corporate boards and internationalization of 
the incentives system for top executives. Tthe undertaking of an international cross-listing 
should not, on its own, be regarded as a completed mission.  
 
Finance-specific advantages and foreign investment 
In efficient and internationally integrated financial markets, no firm has a financial advantage 
over  another,  since  all  firms  have  equal  access  to  finance  at  equal  (risk-adjusted)  cost. 
Arguing  for  a  finance-advantage  effect  thus  requires  an  assumption  of  imperfect  capital 
markets that are at least partially internationally segmented. While the theories underpinning 
Dunnings’ (e.g. 1993) eclectic OLI paradigm (especially internalization theory) largely build 
on imperfections in goods markets, the effects of financial market imperfections have received 
less attention. 
In  a  conceptual  paper,  Oxelheim,  Randøy,  and  Stonehill  (2001)  argue  that  a  firm’s 
financial characteristics are not merely by-products of its competitive strength but constitute a 
distinct set of explanatory variables. By having a superior financial strategy a firm is able to 18 
minimize its cost and maximize its availability of capital relative to its competitors, both 
domestic and foreign. By lowering the discount factor of any investment, such a financial 
advantage increases the firm’s likelihood of engaging in profitable foreign direct invesments 
(FDIs). Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008) brings this argument to the data. As their point of 
departure, they focus on the ownership–location–internalization (OLI) framework (Dunning, 
1993)  since,  in  its  ambition  of  being  all  inclusive,  it  provides  a  list  of  ‘‘standard’’  FDI 
determinants  against  which  they  test  against  the  added  explanatory  value  from  including 
financial factors. They thus construct a number of firm-level financial characteristics ranging 
from simple cost of capital and creditworthiness measures to outright financial strategies – 
such as listing the firm’s equity on large and competitive foreign stock exchanges. The results, 
based on a sample of 1379 European non-financial firms’ cross-border acquisitions in a total 
of 44 target markets, show a strongly significant explanatory power of a number of financial 
characteristics and of financial strategies undertaken in a period of up to 60 months prior to 
the investment. These results give a clear indication of the important role played by finance-
specific factors and support the notion that firms can create ownership advantages by adopting 
strategies to improve their financial strength (in Forssbaeck and Oxelheim, 2011, they find 
support for this also in a general model).  
In the race for inward FDI, history reveals that governments are interested in attracting 
knowledge intense firms by different means altering in the last minute the OLI-pattern to their 
own advantage. The high unemployment rate in most countries following from the financial 
crisis of 2008 and onwards made many government inclined to use non-transparent measures 
like subisides, loan and equity on non-market conditions and warranties to convince firms to 
establish themselves in their country in order for governemts to signal power by creating jobs. 
This  way  they  contribute  artificially  to  lower  the  cost  of  capital  of  the  targetted  firm 
(Oxelheim and Ghauri, 2009). 19 
 
De-listing 
International financial integration is a recurrent phenomenon in history. Financial integration 
was in the pre WW1-period close to perfect and allowed most firms access to global capital 
markets. In the Nordic region – as shown in Oxelheim (2001) - GN Store Nord from Denmark 
was  early out  and  listed in  London already 1869. The Danish  bank  -  Privatbanken (now 
Unibank) – listed in Amsterdam 1899. Norsk Hydro was listed in Geneva and Paris 1909. 
Even  in  between  the  two  World  Wars  the  financial  markets  were  open  to  cross  border 
financial operations. The Swedish company Alfa Laval was listed at three exchanges in 1928 
(London, Geneva and Amsterdam). Other Swedish companies cross-listing in that period were 
Electrolux (London, 1928), SKF (London, 1928, Paris, 1929 and Geneva, 1935) and Swedish 
Match (today famous for snuff).The latter company stands out for its multi-market listing. It 
was listed at 10 European markets between 1922 and 1930. The special feature is that the 
company  was  listed  at  as  many  as  five  markets  in  Switzerland  (Basel,  Bern,  Geneva, 
Lausanne and Zürich). The pattern in the 2010s goes in the opposite direction. Once the firm 
has reached the top of the ladder in Figure 1 and received a global recognition and a global 
cost of capital the firm starts cutting down its listing at multiple markets. The delisting will 
reduce outright costs and further boost the de-listed firm’s cost of capital – something that in 
the  last  two  decades  have  been  made  possible  by  the  development  of  information 
technologies.  
 
Towards a Global Cost of Capital   
Why is a lower cost of capital such an important issue for an aspiring global firm? We identify 
three major reasons why international managers should be concerned. First, in an increasingly 
integrated  world  of  competitive  and  open  product  markets,  producers  have  difficulties  in  20 
passing on a potentially higher cost of capital to customers. Nokia of Finland - the number one 
cellular phone maker in the world (as of late 2010) – does not have a "cozy" home market 
where it can enjoy premium prices. Second, the advent of the knowledge economy makes 
equity financing more important, as the knowledge intensive firms do not make the kind of 
investments that produce collateral for debt financing. Third, the global wave of mergers and 
acquisitions  makes  it  important  for  companies  to  boost  stock  prices  in  order  to  maintain 
influence after a potential merger and protect themselves from being taken over.    
  The globalization of ownership, and thus internationalizing the cost of capital, leads to 
the  new  global  shareholder  regime  (Table  1).  A  successful  internationalization  of  capital 
produces a very international ownership structure, as the firm becomes a necessary part of 
global investors’ world portfolio. Just two years after Nokia of Finland was listed on the 
NYSE in 1994, as much as 61% of its shareholders were resident outside the home country. 
This increased further as Nokia succeeded and actually was about 86% in early 2010.  
 
Lack of transparency means higher cost of capital 
While the meaning of “transparency” can vary from one situation to another, the common 
denominator  is  that  a  lack  of  transparency  creates  some  form  of  information  asymmetry 
(Oxelheim,  2006).  In  the  political  context,  this  asymmetry  often  means  a  difficulty  in 
understanding current policy and uncertainty as to what the next step may be. In relation to a 
specific business – greater transparency helps to bridge the information gap between the firm 
and its investors/potential investors. The price for this lack of transparency appears in the 
form of a  risk premium for ambiguity and opaguness at the firm leve – and as higher cost of 
capital. Hence, a good financial strategy encompasses the disclosure of relevant information 
in order to and achieve “optimal” transparency (Oxelheim, 2010).  
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The link between financial and overall corporate strategies 
 
As summarized in Table 1, shareholder value is the paramount measure of corporate success 
within the global shareholder regime. As stock ownership becomes increasingly international, 
the demands for accurate and timely information increases, and shareholders are showing less 
tolerance for meager performance. In order to build shareholder interest this research suggests 
that companies need to have an active investor relations function. Building confidence with 
international institutional investors should be the main focus of this activity, and case stories 
like Nokia show how this has been successful in the past (Oxelheim et al 1998).  
 
Table 1: The Effect of a Global Cost of Capital: The Global Shareholder Regime 
 
Effect on Shareholders and Governing Structure 
- Potentially higher stock price: increased shareholder returns 
- More demanding shareholders and less "loyal" if a company does not satisfy expectations.  
- Top management and investor relations need to focus on international institutional investors 
- Need to strengthen the corporate board and add more independent directors 
- Need to redesign incentive packages for key personnel based on shareholder value. 
 
Effect on Business Strategy 
- Need to focus business strategy on core competencies and disposal of non-core business 
lines.   
- Need to be able to attract large amount of funds: strategic flexibility 
- The firm is more exposed to takeovers (taking down take-over defenses) 
- Need to make the firm attractive as a partner for mergers  
 
A company with global ambitions needs to focus on corporate governance in order to 
gain shareholder confidence. One possible firm response could be to strengthen the governing 
board by recruiting a larger number of outside directors. Oxelheim, Gregoric, Randøy and 
Thomsen  (2011)  highlight  how  it  is  mostly  financial  globalization  that  drives  the 
internationalization  of  boards.  Moreover,  the  NASDAQ  Stock  Exchange  requires  that  a 
company that seeks listing have a majority of independent (outside) directors (NASDAQ, 22 
2010). Furthermore, global investors expect that top management compensation be linked to 
the creation of shareholder value.  
  Furthermore, we argue that the financial strategy of gaining “membership” of a global 
shareholder regime affects the business strategy of the firm. In the "old world order" finance 
played a secondary role to business strategy, not so any more. Unless the company focuses on 
its core competence and disposes non-core activities, the company can be exposed to a hostile 
takeover attempt. Long-term confidence needs to be built with major institutional investors, 
such that a large amount of funds can be accessed if necessary (typically in relation to an 
acquisition). A company can strengthen its strategic flexibility and thus provide strategic real 
options  by  building  trust  with  large  investors.  Within  the  global  shareholder  regime 
companies with an active defense against takeovers are penalized. For example, within the 
Nordic economies non-voting shares have become rather unattractive to investors. The cost of 
various takeover defenses can be measured in terms of lower stock price and thus a higher 
cost of capital. This provides closely controlled companies with a strong incentive for a more 
transparent shareholder policy. In fact, making the company an attractive partner of a potential 
merger becomes an important route to higher shareholder return.     
 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter we have shown ways for aspiring global companies to achieve an international 
cost of capital. We have illustrated our theoretical arguments by referring to some relevant 
case studies. These cases show how access to competitively priced capital accelerated the 
international growth prospects of companies from small and thin capital markets at the end of 
the 20
th century. In fact, without this funding the competitiveness of these firms would have 
been significantly hampered. We claim that the our cases form the Nordic market provide an 
excellent “laboratory” to understand successful execution of a global financial strategy and its 23 
implication for overall corporate strategy. At the beginning of the 2010s  this is particularly 
appropriate for any small- to medium-sized firm, as well as larger firms from more segmented 
capital markets in emerging economies.  
We argue that the corporate motivation for internationalizing the cost of capital is the 
starting point for understanding a firm’s globalization of ownership. Globalization of capital is 
particularly appropriate in conjunction with globalization on the product side. Second, we 
emphasize the need to link the business strategy with the financial strategy. Several avenues to 
internationalizing the cost of capital exist; such as international cross-listing, foreign stock 
issues, strategic equity alliances, internationalization of corporate governance and receiving 
support from governments. We argue that globalization of capital is more advantageous to 
companies  with  unique  products/services  and/or  unique  resources  that  serve  high-growth 
markets.  
The internationalization of ownership calls for a new shareholder regime. First of all 
the internationalization affects shareholders and governing of firms, as global capital tends to 
be less tolerant of meager performance. Second, this implies that executives need to focus on 
the  core  competencies  of  the  firm,  as  investors  do  not  approve  value-destroying 
diversification.  Furthermore,  global  ownership  also  provides  executives  with  greater 
opportunities to finance high-return/high-risk projects.   
For the home country of aspiring global firms, internationalization of capital provides 
both opportunities and threats. On the positive side internationalization of capital allows small 
country to produce some impressive global companies, such as Novo of Denmark, Nokia of 
Finland and Ericsson of Sweden. On the other side, global firms are becoming more “foot 
loose”  and  without  the  right  government  policies  (or  other  factors  beyond  the  control  of 
governments) companies will move abroad.  
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Figure  1  Major  corporate  strategies  for  eliminating  cross-border  information 




Source: Oxelheim (2001) 